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ABSTRACT
We investigate the problem of identifying adversarial attacks on image-based neural networks. We
present intriguing experimental results showing significant discrepancies between the explanations gener-
ated for the predictions of a model on clean and adversarial data. Utilizing this intuition, we propose
a framework which can identify whether a given input is adversarial based on the explanations given
by the model. Code for our experiments can be found here: https://github.com/seansaito/
Explaining-Away-Attacks-Against-Neural-Networks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Adversarial attacks cause state-of-the-art neural networks
to make misclassifications to inputs with imperceptible per-
turbations (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014).
In this work, we propose a framework for detecting adver-
sarial attacks by utilizing the explanations of the model’s
predictions. Our experiments in Section 4 demonstrate that
this framework can detect untargeted attacks at 99.81% ac-
curacy and targeted attacks at 99.87% accuracy.
2 EXPLAINING PREDICTIONS ON
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In an adversarial attack, the goal of an attacker is to con-
struct an input x˜ that is minimally perturbed from the origi-
nal clean input x which causes some misclassification (an
untargeted attack) or a desired prediction (a targeted at-
tack) from a neural network. Several methods exist which
achieve this, including the Basic Iterative Method (BIM)
(Kurakin et al., 2016), which iteratively finds the gradient
of the model’s loss function with respect to the input:
x0 = x
˜xi+1 = xi −  · sign(∇xiJ(xi, yt))
where  controls the magnitude of peturbations made to
the image, resulting in perceptively identical images which
cause large deviations in the behavior of the model. We
hypothesize that the explanations of the model on each
prediction would also vary significantly, which could poten-
tially be a clue to identify whether a given prediction was
caused by an adversarial attack.
1SAP Asia, Singapore. Correspondence to: Sean Saito
<sean.saito@sap.com>, Jin Wang <jin.wang02@sap.com>.
Proceedings of the 2nd SysML Conference, Palo Alto, CA, USA,
2019. Copyright 2019 by the author(s).
Figure 1. A comparison of SHAP Integrated Gradients computed
for a pair of clean and adversarial images. The prediction for
African elephant had a confidence of 99.00%, whereas the predic-
tion for ping-pong ball was 99.21%.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we generate explanations via the
SHAP Integrated Gradients framework (Lundberg & Lee,
2017), a framework which combines Integrated Gradients, a
gradient-based pixel attribution method (Sundararajan et al.,
2017), with SHAP, an additive feature attribution method
that calculates Shapley values for each pixel:
IGi(x) =
xi − bi
m
m∑
h=1
∂f
∂xi
(b+
h
m
(x− b))
In all experiments in this work, we generate explanations
via the Inception-V3 model (Szegedy et al., 2016). Figure 1
displays an example of explanations generated for a pair of
clean and adversarial images. Red and blue values indicate
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the SHAP value of each pixel. The figure indicates qualita-
tively that the SHAP values for the clean image predictions
are larger than those of the adversarial image.
Figure 2. A comparison of SHAP Integrated Gradients distribu-
tions between clean images and adversarial images.
Figure 2 shows a distributional comparison of the absolute
SHAP values across 1,000 test images from the ImageNet
(Deng et al., 2009) dataset. We again observe a significant
difference in the distribution between the SHAP values of
clean and adversarial images. This suggests that neural
networks are unable to provide sufficient ”evidence” when
explaining its decisions on adversarial examples. This intu-
ition leads to our proposed framework of detecting adver-
sarial attacks.
3 A FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTING
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
We propose a simple yet effective framework for detecting
adversarial attacks. Based on the training images (Sori),
adversarial samples (Sadv), and neural network f , we treat
the SHAP values coming from the predictions of f as feature
descriptors, denoted as Zori and Zadv respectively. We
combine Zori and Zadv to construct a binary classification
dataset which trains an adversarial example detector D(z).
For any future sample s and prediction f(s), we generate
SHAP values zs and call D(zs) to indicate whether the
sample is adversarial.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Our dataset contains 10,000 pairs of images from ImageNet
across all classes, with 20% held out for testing. We employ
three types of BIM attacks: untargeted, targeted (random
class), and targeted (2nd most confident class). We set  as
0.1 for all attacks. Table 1 shows attack success rates.
We experiment with two off-the-shelf classifiers to assess
how well they can detect adversarial examples based on the
SHAP feature descriptors. Results shown in Table 2 indicate
that simple classifiers can detect adversarial examples with
high accuracy.
Table 1. Attack success rate of each attack
Success Rate
Untargeted attack 99.13%
Targeted attack (random) 98.41%
Targeted attack (2nd most confident) 99.87%
Table 2. Accuracy of detecting each attack
Logistic
Regression
Random
Forest
Untargeted attack 99.16% 99.81%
Targeted attack (random) 98.96% 99.83%
Targeted attack (2nd confident) 99.17% 99.87%
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown empirical results suggesting that explana-
tions can help us detect adversarial attacks. Future work
would focus on evaluating and refining this method under
additional threat models.
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